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Max Weber Lecture 
            EUI, June 10, 2009   
 
BETWEEN  SURPRISE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
 
 
I want to thank my hosts for inviting me to deliver one of the Max Weber lectures.  It 
is daunting to offer an academic address that honors so important a social scientist.  The 
request was to address a topic with implications for the social sciences.  I have chosen to 
explore a problem that might seem hardly an issue at all; but, for reasons I will develop, I 
believe to be challenging and important – namely the role of surprise in history and the 
social sciences.  (It is one of a series of problems I chose to call abiding problems of 
historical explanation – the relation of large-scale events to personal decision making, the 
relationship of one approach, say economic history, to another, say cultural history, etc. )  
But I have chosen to focus on surprise today, because we live in an age of surprises. My 
underlying question is: can the social sciences accommodate surprise?  Put even more 
strongly, can we develop a theory of surprise for the social sciences?   
 
 Perhaps the search will be fruitless.  Isn’t surprise precisely what resists theoretical 
understanding?  The social sciences search for normative behavior, that is behavior or 
developments that exemplify general rules or (according to Weber) stylized patterns 
highlighted as so-called ideal types.  By definition, though, surprise violates general 
patterns so it should make no sense to try and subsume it under them.  History, as we 
know, occupies an ambiguous position with respect to the social sciences.  Historians can 
share the search for regularities and general developments that characterizes sociology 
and political science.  But historians also investigate themes and subjects that claim 
uniqueness.  At first glance, surprise seems compatible with historical reconstruction, but 
not with the nomothetic social sciences, those that allow generalization and laws.  But to 
exclude surprise from the purview of the social sciences is a heavy renunciation.  Perhaps 
we can do something to bring it back.  Let’s try in any case. 
 
Surprise in this case is easy enough to define: it means the coming to pass of 
unexpected possibilities for the future, indeed possibilities that have often been dismissed 
with great verve and confidence.  By surprise, I do not mean what we often think of as 
contingent events, although they do come as surprises, but sustained developments that 
defy expectations or emerge without being anticipated whatsoever.  Thus I am not talking 
just about such unexpected assaults as 9/11 or the assassination of Francis Ferdinand on 
June 28, 1914.  The fact that the European powers were in a tremendous war five weeks 
later was a surprise, although, paradoxically, one that they had been preparing for 
decades.  The fact that the war was to go on for over four years came as another surprise 
to many of the policy makers, soldiers, and citizens – though not to all of them.  The 
surprise that is continually prepared for or anticipated – but never really expected, at least 
not at the present moment, such as the healthy individual’s own death, or a macro event 
such as World War I, or a future nuclear war, is one of the most interesting species of 
surprise.  Conversely there are outcomes that seem totally unlikely to most observers.    2 
One of my favorites is the prediction that Josef Schumpeter made in 1930, when as an 
economics professor in Bonn, he wrote in his essay, “Das soziale Antlitz des Deutschen 
Reichs,” that whether one looked to the political left or to the Right, German politics 
offered no cheer for extremists. Now a prediction gone wrong is not the only variety of 
surprise.  Surprises also include developments that seemed unimaginable or at least 
unimagined but which in fact came to pass.   
 
Since we presume that no event is causeless, after these surprising developments take 
place, historians and social scientists work to reconstruct the reasons they come to pass.  
Indeed with the benefit of hindsight, many of those who never envisaged their occurrence 
often insist that they had to take place.  Alexis de Tocqueville said it best when he wrote 
about the French Revolution that no event was less expected, but that in retrospect none 
seemed more inevitable.  Nevertheless – and this is critical – historians and social 
scientists alike find their true vocation not in rendering surprise inevitable, but plausible 
in retrospect.  Surprise, in effect, challenges us construct a story that renders it 
unsurprising.  
 
Of course, it is not only the great French Revolution or the First World War that 
caught participants and observers by surprise.  One reason I have chosen this topic is that 
our own contemporary era has been full of major surprises – developments that even the 
greatest of social scientists confidently believed could not occur, or were at least being 
made less and less likely.  The lifetime of any middle-aged adult today has been filled 
with confident and erroneous predictions and with events that were never predicted.   
Does it not behoove us, therefore, to devote some serious thought to surprise as a 
sociological phenomenon in its own right?   Are there different sorts of surprise in 
history?  Indeed history writing often hinges on the narration and analysis of events that 
seemed surprising.  Historians construct their narratives out of events that surprised.  
Indeed the event is often tantamount to a surprise.  Sometimes historians claim that these 
surprises are part of a developmental logic, sometimes not.  Political scientists are usually 
determined to explain them as part of a developmental momentum – therein lies one of 
the differences that separate our guilds.  But are there epochs of history that are more 
prone to surprise than others?  And if so, why? Might our susceptibility to the unexpected 
itself say something important about our contemporary historical situation as well as 
illustrating the limits of social science?  
  
                                                                    
2.    As a historian, I will start by citing some histories in abbreviated form. They are 
chastening or sobering stories since they concern predictions that went wrong.  And then 
I will devote some attention to perhaps the most recent big surprise – the one with which 
most of us are all contending: the financial and economic crisis that overtook the global 
economy in 2008 and 2009.  As a case study it will help us think analytically about 
surprise – and it will enable us to distinguish surprise from crisis – two sorts of difficult 
transitions that share some elements but are not identical.  
 
The first takes us back to Daniel Bell’s famous essay of 1959:  “The End of 
Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties.”  To be fair to Bell, an   3 
imaginative sociologist to whom we owe so many interesting ideas, he subtitled his 
essay: “On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties.”  But “the end of ideology”  
rapidly became a popular trope:  After the horrors inflicted by fascism and Nazism, after 
the disillusion with the Stalinist record in the Purges and the postwar years, political 
leaders and publics, so many commentators assured their readers and students, were no 
longer passionate about political doctrines.  Instead, they were coming to rest in a sort of 
centrist and technocratic politics, which might bring together Communist and Western 
capitalist systems in a sort of gentle social democracy – the consequence of the 
“industrial society” which both systems represented.   Otto Kirchheimer made the same 
point a few years later in Robert Dahl’s collection of essays on the decline of 
fundamental political opposition in Europe.  Politics, they assured us, was at least a 
temporarily sleeping volcano, emitting a few traces of vapor, but no longer likely to spew 
forth cinders and lava. 
 
There was good reason to tell this story in the first half of the 1960s: the Labour 
Party was moving away from Point IV, the SPD was shedding its Marxism; Communists 
seemed confined to an electoral ghetto in Western Europe; neo-Nazism never emerged as 
more than a marginal political force.  By the second half of the sixties, however, Mao 
unleashed the cultural revolution in China,  protest movements filled the streets in 
American Black ghettos, marchers mobilized against Vietnam, l968 protests brought the 
Fifth Republic almost to its knees and seemed about to rupture the Soviet bloc --  political 
passions were erupting anew.  The end of ideology was soon forgotten. 
            
Recall a second story from the late l970s.  Western capitalist economies were mired 
in so-called stagflation.  Inflation rates were running from 8 to 12 percent, while 
unemployment averaged five percent or more.  The happy days of three-to-five percent 
economic growth with low rates of inflation – the long-term effortless macroeconomic 
performance of the so-called trente glorieuses -- had collapsed between l967, with 
America’s inflationary financing of its escalation in Vietnam, and l974, with OPEC’s 
tripling of the price of oil.  Even if those body blows to economic stability not sufficient, 
a second price rise by OPEC at the end of the l970s would provide another powerful 
inflationary thrust to the so-called advanced capitalist economies.  What is more, 
powerful unions were convinced that they must bring home major wage increases to 
compensate for their deteriorating real wages, but thereby only unleashed an ongoing 
cost-push inflation.  The Bretton Woods rules designed to restore international currency 
stability after the Second World were under pressure from the late l960s, when President 
Nixon had “shut the gold window” on August 15, 1971, and introduced a period of wage 
and price controls.  Living through these years of inflation, labor activism, what seemed 
the inexorable rise of public expenditure, many Western analysts (including the ones I 
hung out with and many of whom taught at this institution then or later, such as Philippe 
Schmitter and Alessandro Pizzorno) developed the intellectual framework of neo-
corporatism.  According to this fashionable account (with its West German cousin of 
“organized capitalism”), the modern political economy no longer functioned according to 
the rules of market capitalism.  With its powerful producer groups often bargaining 
collusively to pass on the costs of wage settlements to the consumer or the state, only 
political oversight of economic bargaining might provide the necessary stability.  The   4 
state had to organize tripartite wage-price boards, perhaps provide indexation of wages or 
taxes, coordinate sessions of annual wage bargaining.  True, there were some rightwing 
economists who preached an alternative remedy that would get the government out of 
economic bargaining and refuse to increase money supplies – but their so-called 
monetarist doctrines seemed impractical or archaic. 
 
Then in 1979 came the election of Margaret Thatcher and a year later the victory of 
Ronald Reagan, each of whom did what none of us social scientists believed possible: 
they defeated powerful trade unions in Britain and the United States and shook out 
inflationary pressure through the harsh medicine of major recessions.  Moreover, in Italy 
– the most inflation-prone West European society – FIAT workers in Turin rejected a 
CGL strike call and undermined the hold of the Communist-led national labor union.  
The new centrist governments of laici and Socialists set about controlling the state deficit 
and giving autonomy to the Bank of Italy.  Somewhat in parallel, 1983 the Socialist 
government of François Mitterrand abandoned the revived Popular Front program it had 
espoused two years earlier – and introduced orthodox measures to stabilize French 
currency within the European monetary system.  By the mid-1980s, neo-Keynesian 
economic doctrines were in retreat before a revived monetarism as pioneered by Milton 
Freedman or before a newer belief in the importance of credibly signaling “expectations,” 
a new prescription associated with Thomas Sargent.  
 
With the collapse of the European communist regimes in 1989, the revival of market 
capitalism seemed triumphant.  President Clinton made the creation of market 
democracies the centerpiece of his international aspirations.  No one recalled that the 
prominent political theorist of the l970s, Robert Dahl, had argued that such an idea was 
an oxymoron:  markets and democracies he believed remained in fundamental tension 
with each other.  But now during the course of the 1980s and l990s,  contrary to a 
generation of prevailing social science analysis, decentralized market economies were the 
inspiration for nations the world over.  In effect, the European, North American, even the 
Latin American Left found themselves abandoning their inherited assumptions and 
transforming themselves into so-called New Democratic or later, New Labour 
movements stressing centrist macroeconomic management.  Insofar as the parties of the 
Left had a program it consisted of a slightly greater openness on identity issues, not 
distributive issues.  The left was friendlier to immigrants, to minorities, to women, to 
gays, but was timid on issues of class and redistribution. 
 
Surprise three was the crisis and collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe mentioned above.  The disintegration of this imperial ideological regime unrolled 
with breathtaking rapidity at the end of the l980s as Mikhail Gorbachev pursued an effort 
at reforming the Soviet Union through glasnost and perestroika that escaped his control 
and led to the advent of multiparty governments.  It is important to recall the 
astonishment that those of us who had spent our adult lives beholding these regimes, and 
the power of the party that controlled them, felt as they dissolved, largely without 
violence.  Only a few visionary poets and priests – Symborska, Herbert, Havel, Wojtila 
among others – seemed to have believed that such a transition might be feasible and not 
just morally necessary.  Most of us – whether West German advocates of Ostpolitik or   5 
sophisticated social scientists – never believed that the Communist regimes would be 
overthrown or collapse.  They might evolve into more stable and less repressive systems 
– but that they could simply disappear seemed an impossible historical turn.  The 
Communist system had stabilized: whether by ugly means such as the Berlin wall, or 
more benignly through a sort of reformist evolution.  Only those to whom we granted 
artistic license denied that it was a long-term feature of global politics, with us for the 
longue durée.   
 
  This was not just a consequence of disinterested analysis. For many years 
powerful interests had developed with an interest in interpreting the world as frozen into 
opposed camps, including military establishments and foreign policy think tanks. Policy 
intellectuals, liberal as well as conservative, claimed to be working for fundamental 
change, but quite logically had an interest in the prolongation of the status quo.  
 
  Let me remind you of a fourth story with a surprise ending: the alleged triumph of 
secularization.  In the old confident narrative, as societies became modern their religious 
impulses irretrievably faded as reliance on science and technology and education 
increased.  Sociologists assured us that the power of churches and sects over public life 
was ineluctably waning.  Modern societies either abandoned religious practices or they 
consigned religious impulses to the private realm.  This confident notion, of course, has 
been in retreat now for three decades, ever since.  Revision started even before an Islamic 
Republic came to power in Iran in 1978; before the United States yielded to a period of 
renewed religiosity; before evangelical movements started sweeping the Third World; 
and before 9/11.  By 2009, we had come to inhabit a world where issues of belief became 
the major impulse to broad social movements. 
 
It would be a wasted opportunity, of course, not to cite a fifth large surprise: the 
story that we are in the midst of today: the collapse of equity values in 2008 and the 
current severe recession.  I will return to this large surprise, but recall for the moment that 
it has brought with it at least a major reassessment of cherished policy ideas, indeed 
precisely the economic analyses that arrived with Reagan and Thatcher and later Alan 
Greenspan, namely the confidence in the rationality of markets and the charismatic 
wisdom of bankers and entrepreneurs.  Whether such a reassessment will be durable or 
widespread will depend, of course, on the severity of the present economic difficulties.  
Like soldiers under fire, who make promises to God they then find hard to keep, our 
public pundits soon repent of their conversions.  Economics is perhaps the most amnesiac 
of the social sciences, so the current disavowals of last year’s doctrines and heroes may 
soon be renounced in their turn if recovery comes rapidly.   
                  
 
3.     Can we make some generalizations about the nature of the surprises these cases and 
others have sprung on us?  It is easy to make fun of the confident assertions of how 
history had moved and was moving, but I am not lodging the usual complaint about the 
uselessness of social science and the irrelevance of social scientists.  But it does seem to 
me that “surprise” deserves some sustained reflection.  What constitutes it?  Will we ever 
eliminate it or at least diminish its role?  I have pondered this question since the fall of   6 
the communist regimes in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Hungary in the fall of l989.  At that point there was a great deal of blame placed on social 
scientists for not foreseeing the collapse of communism.  All these worthies…all 
surprised  -- fit subjects for mockery especially by conservative circles who saw the rise 
of socialism as somehow connected with the Left and the legacy of 1968.    
 
  I believe this attitude was misplaced.  I emerged from thinking about 1989 – to 
which I devoted a major book project – convinced that in fact it was ‘OK’ to be surprised.  
What one should not be surprised at is the role of surprise.  My sense is that “ordinary” 
social science (in the Kuhnian sense) is not equipped to cope with surprise.  Let us reflect 
a minute on why this is so.  Ultimately social science endeavors to account for events that 
can be represented by probability distributions or represented by continuous functions 
with a derivative at any point.  To use a mathematical analogy, social science works with 
derivatives and integrals, predictions drawn from social trends, or social trends 
constructed from predictions.  Or it draws causal inferences from least square 
calculations derived from multiple data points.  But surprises are almost by definitions 
represented by non-continuous functions, kinks in the curves that describe trends, 
functions that can yield no derivatives over their length.  It can come as no surprise that 
social scientists are doomed to be surprised.  
 
Yet if some of us are not ashamed to be surprised, we still have no theory of surprise 
– which, given the role it plays, is perhaps itself surprising.  After all, think of it: our 
political life and our intellectual life is governed by surprise. My pension accumulation is 
worth a quarter less than it was two years ago. That is a rude surprise.  The countries of 
eastern Europe are functioning democracies.  That came to many of us as a happy 
surprise.  People are blowing themselves up over religious loyalties.  That is a surprise 
whose cumulative effect adds up to a total of thousands of lives destroyed and perhaps 
the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of human lifetimes spent at airport security gates.  
We live in a world governed by surprise.  Doesn’t it behoove us to have a theory of how 
surprise works? 
 
In fact, alert observers have been working toward such theories – so far as I am 
aware – more on the level of vernacular sociology than of specialized literature.  But I 
could be wrong. There is a science of rare events with which I am not yet familiar, and it 
may anticipate much of what I believe necessary.  In any case many of the recent popular 
books concerning the phenomena of the social world are reflections of a heightened 
sensitivity to surprise:  consider the works of Malcolm Gladwell and Nassim Nicholas 
Taleb.  Gladwell celebrates intuitive knowledge, which I think misplaced, and focuses 
our attention on the “tipping point” – the point at which a social trend becomes infectious 
and catches on.  In effect he examines precisely those instants where functions are 
discontinuous and surprising outcomes are generated.  Taleb proposes that most of the 
significant developments in our economic and sociopolitical life are governed not by the 
ordinary expectations we can generate through Gaussian bell curves, but by outlying 
developments he calls “black swans” many standard deviations away from the normal 
distribution.  
   7 
But consider, too, what theories of history have become increasingly appealing, if 
not to a general public that has virtually no awareness of them, at least among academic 
circles.  It is no accident, I believe, that Walter Benjamin’s theses on history are cited 
with increasing frequency. They call for us to understand historical thinking and writing 
not as an effort to reconstruct a causal story or to come as close as possible to “how it 
actually was,” but as a process of archeological retrieval and as a source of illumination.  
Benjamin was fascinated by archeological fragments throughout his life, from his 
doctoral dissertation on “The Origins of German Tragic Drama” to the never-ending 
accumulation of materials in the Paris based “Arcades Project.”  To understand history 
was to look backward, along with his famous angel, and witness the wreckage piling up.  
What was gained was not a causal or sequential understanding, but a flood of intuition. In 
this vision, historians have no problem with surprise, for we are supposed to live, I think 
Benjamin tells us, as if perpetually surprised.  The question such a view leaves historians 
is whether they really can be content with a sort of prophetic vocation.  Too much 
historical knowledge may paralyze, as Nietzsche suggested, but too little a commitment 
to causal ordering may leave only reportage or invocations of supposedly ineffable 
experiences.  The issue remains: is it not possible to do justice to surprise without 
surrendering to mysticism? 
 
Do branches of mathematics offer an alternative?  If ordinary social theory rests on 
statistical inference or generalizations and predictions that rely on implicitly continuous 
functions, how about the mathematics of non-continuous developments? Thirty years 
ago, the Franco-Vietnamese mathematician, René Thom, sought to develop so-called 
catastrophe theory as a way of formalizing the “cusps” that represented breaks in trends.  
So far as I can grasp this tantalizing notion, however, it fails to theorize surprise for two 
reasons.  First of all, it describes changes of pace in societal development – it is a theory 
of acceleration, but not necessarily a theory of how changes in direction are 
endogenously generated.  It attempts to map suddenness, not veering.  It seeks to model, 
say, how the French Revolution arose, but not why more gradual surprises – recall the 
example of secularization -- take place.  Secondly, it never became more than a sort of 
analogical image: the social scientist or the historian might graph how sudden change 
looked, but not when it was to occur or how it would develop.  It offered no numerical 
parameters.  (I personally believe that ultimately most forms of twentieth century 
cognition offer us no more than analogy; but that is probably another lecture.) 
 
More recently “chaos theory,” seemed initially to offer a mathematical approach to 
surprise.  I cannot claim to have penetrated this branch even after some efforts to read the 
publications of the Santa Fe Institute.  Chaos theory suggests that what might be a trivial 
departure from regular initial conditions expands so that the final results are 
unpredictable from the original point.  It is a denial of Laplace’s notion that if enough is 
known about initial conditions, their end result can be predicted with confidence.  Strictly 
speaking the results are not chaotic: but tend to swing around points termed attractors, 
and a new overall pattern does seem discernable if no individual final results can be 
predicted.   But chaos theory, I believe, is more relevant for the modeling of crises than of 
surprises.  Crises often arise as surprises but can be distinguished from them, and a crisis 
can continue long after it ceases to be surprising.  Nor need a crisis be surprising at all. A   8 
crisis is a sort of vicious circle, perhaps endogenously generated in a dialectic process. A 
deep crisis emerges when efforts to solve it, whether diplomatic or economic, end up 
deepening it so that one cannot restore the original regime conditions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
4.  Given the difficulties of analyzing surprise as a phenomenon in itself, I want to 
propose a different approach for understanding what is at stake – an approach that 
depends not upon the unexpected event or trend in its own right, but upon the perception 
and interpretation of what is taking place. When the historian encounters a surprise, he or 
she constructs a narrative, that is, a causal sequence to accommodate it, explain it and 
thereby render it non-surprising.  To make surprise not surprising thus entails finding 
alternative narratives. Surprise in effect reveals a history that potentially existed, but 
which we had chosen to ignore.  In this sense surprise serves as a narrative switching 
point that moves us from a history that has become unfruitful or even illusory to one that 
better corresponds to observable data, i.e. that has become factual.  
 
Imagine two railroad lines that are running roughly parallel to each other, then suddenly 
converge at a switch, and then separate again at another switch.  We thought we were 
riding on a railroad from Paris to Amsterdam, but somehow were switched on to the line 
from Paris to Rome.  The passengers chat in all languages so give us no clue as to where 
we are heading.  Arriving at Rome, we must tell the story of a different journey than the 
one we would have told had we arrived at Amsterdam.  Do we say that we had climbed 
on the wrong train to begin with?  That the switchman made an error?  That the switch 
and mechanism wobbled by chance?   The quantum theorist might say that in fact we had 
climbed on both trains and decided on one only at the switching point.  Or that there was 
no way of knowing which train we had climbed on and which way they would go.  Or 
even that we were always travelling on both trains but told only one of the stories.   In 
any case, surprise is the mother of historical invention.  Nonetheless, the historical 
narrative, like the social scientific explanation, is designed to make the surprising appear 
quite predictable. 
 
  Once again, consider a few examples from our recent experience – first, the 
revision of the secularization thesis; second, the history of the Communist implosion; and 
finally an alternative historical outline for the development of the economic crisis in 
which have been caught up in the last year.    
 
I am not a sociologist of religion, but it is clear that new narratives have altered the 
received history of secularization and compete. In fact two new narratives compete for 
acceptance.  One is that of “multiple modernities” and the persistence of religious praxis 
in the widest sense as the expression of a benign pluralism.  Tallal Assad is the most 
highly regarded exponent of such a view.  Peter Berger might provide an American 
version of “big tent” religiosity.  That is the gentle narrative that American liberals like to 
tell each other.  There is of course a harsher narrative, which focuses on the emergence of 
Islamic Jihad, as developed most convincingly by Gilles Keppel.  This history constructs 
a story not of multiple modernities, but of a crusade, in effect, against the modern, and it 
seeks its sources in the doctrines of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or Shi’ite   9 
practices.  Two new stories, but both of them are revisions of a secularization narrative 
and incorporate what was unexpected.   
 
Consider the second example:  If we examine the history of Communism and the 
Left in the l980s, much of its astonishing impression, I would suggest, arises from our 
having misunderstood the relationship of the collapse of state socialism in the Soviet 
sphere and the ideological collapse of the social democratic Left in the West.  With 
respect to Italy and France, the collapse of a left alternative in terms of political economy 
(or of an anticommunist Christian Democracy) is usually described as a consequence of 
the lamentable collapse of Soviet Communism.  But if we construe the disarray that 
overtook the Soviet Union and its satellites as part of the general failure of collectivist 
ideas in the economic turmoil of the l970s and l980s, this unprecedented realignment 
appears no less major a sequence of events, but one that has an understandable pre-
history.  Gorbachev’s failure to stabilize a reformed Communist regime is comprehended 
as part of an overarching loss of faith in state intervention that overtook all the economies 
poised at the edge of the post-Fordist era.  Again, surprise compels a revisiting of causal 
histories believed to be adequate but revealed as overlooking major forces for change. 
 
Let us consider in conclusion the origins of the current financial crisis  -- a traumatic 
surprise to thousands of professionals in the banking and financial industries well as to 
the political classes and the general public.  The financial professionals and economists 
quickly constructed an explanatory narrative designed to minimize their own 
contributions to this outcome.  They emphasized instead the role of improvident 
borrowers who should not have been allowed to acquire their own homes – despite the 
fact that broad-based home ownership has been a key component of continually nurtured 
American ideology.  Banks and national credit facilities then provided loans to borrowers 
who should not have been expected to service them.  But I believe this conventional 
narrative really obscures the true long-term pressures behind the collapse of asset values.   
The subprime market alone was not at the origin of the crisis. The underlying pressures 
and motive forces emanated not from imprudent borrowers anxious to obtain a high 
mortgage or a credit based on their supposedly rising home equity, but from those who 
had the power to extend credit.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
My alternative story focuses on the profligate supply side of credit creation, not the 
improvident demand.  Americans (and others) became improvident because they were 
paid to be improvident.  And they were paid to be improvident because financial 
institutions could earn easy profits because they were granted the right collectively to 
issue far greater supplies of credit at virtually no cost.  The outlines of the story are 
simple.  The capitalist economy of the l970s, in which governments created massive 
amounts of money, whether (as in the case of the United States) to finance greater 
military efforts, or to meet the new three-fold hike in the price of oil imposed by a newly 
united producers’ cartel, or to pay the higher demands of organized labor  led to sustained 
inflation.  After several years of coordinated and inflationary wage bargaining throughout 
the West, at the beginning of the 1980s,  the leaders and publics of the capitalist world 
decided they must simply tourniquet public money supplies.  Monetarist advocates 
argued that stabilizing the quantity of money would stabilize prices.  Exponents of the   10 
newer school of expectations argued that changing the expectations for future inflation on 
the part of  unions, employers, and state bureaucrats would likewise end inflation.  In any 
case, something worked – the process of ending inflation took hold.  It was the 
achievement of the l980s, in Israel, Italy, Latin America as well as in the US and UK, 
where Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher cut taxes and after recovery from the 
recession of l982 reduced money supplies.  Central banks were given more independence 
and not required to monetize government debt.  Even the Bank of Italy gained an 
independent status.  The Bank of England gained greater autonomy from the Exchequer.  
Odysseus successfully tied himself to the mast even as the sirens sang.  In effect the l980s 
limited the creation of public credit and ended a long-term inflationary conjuncture.   
 
But – and here is the core of my narrative – governments accomplished this task only 
by letting the private banking sector and investors create a compensatory mass of credits 
over the next years.   The liquidity that public authorities and independent central bankers 
sopped up in the public sector, they allowed to be created in the private sector.  Private 
financial institutions were unleashed in every conceivable way, whether through lowered 
reserve requirements or changed institutional structures or public back-up facilities.  This 
heady process, I believe, was the price that societies paid for entrepreneurial support.  For 
a while they could export the consequences to such emerging economies as Mexico and 
Thailand, but finally the difficulties appeared at the center of the system. 
 
In other political economy transactions in pluralist political systems, the 
representatives of labor as well as capital have had to be rewarded.  But this time 
governments and banks no longer had to pay a price.  The traditional influence of labor 
delegates was vastly reduced.  More militant unions in Britain and the U.S. met stunning 
defeats at the hands of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.  The long ideological 
traditions that supported those unions whether in the Anglo-Saxon world or on the 
continent – whether these concepts were reformist or Marxist -- withered away.  Labor 
leaders had already been demoralized by the earlier results of indexation.  They came to 
believe in the irrelevance of earlier collectivist beliefs and accepted the analysis of 
markets and entrepreneurship that seemed to justify itself in the years of growth after the 
mid-1980s.  The crisis and collapse of the Communist systems did not directly undermine 
them, but it demonstrated that all Marxist-derived ideas seemed ill-fitted for the post-
industrial world.  By the new century the massive relocation of manufacturing 
employment to Asia and Latin America, i.e. globalization, had dealt further blows.  The 
new profile of occupations in a so-called post-industrial era reduced the mass base of the 
trade unions.   
 
The result was that there was no counter-hegemonic ideas to the great development 
of reducing public monetary creation but vastly expanding private monetary capacity.  
Governments of left and right granted the private financial sector the privilege of creating 
the liquidity they had renounced for the state.  It should be stressed that such 
compensatory monetary loosening was a bipartisan achievement in the U.S.  It found its 
major exponents in the policies of the Clinton Administration.  The Mexican rescue, the 
subsequent effort to offset the Southeast Asia financial collapse, the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall prohibition on fusing commercial and investment banks,  the periodic lowering   11 
of the Federal Reserve’s interest rates to keep the equities markets advancing (or 
recovering) were the product of a regime that believed deeply in market democracies.  
All this meant the potential for a vast expansion of credit and monetary equivalents that 
went searching for opportunities to earn a profit  -- whether in emerging markets or the 
American housing sector, or in the stock market. 
 
Indeed, looking back one can discern a significant but unavowed change in the 
underlying parameters that financial authorities were relying on to determine policy.  The 
language of the French “regulation” school alerts analysts to the often unofficial priority 
given to different economic indices that serve for setting finance policy in different eras. 
It suggests that economic policies in effect are based on key parameters.  The gold 
standard before World War I and the amended gold exchange standard between the wars 
gave priority to the gold value of currencies even at the cost of high employment.  After 
the experience of the l930s and the Second World War, macroeconomic management 
tended to switch from a gold standard to a full-employment standard as the orienting 
variable.  Once this “Keynesian” phase seemed to unleash unacceptable levels of 
inflation, central bankers restored price and exchange-rate stability as the regulative 
parameter in the 1980s, a priority written into the mandate of the European Central Bank. 
And this indeed became the overriding parameter of the l980s.   
 
But policy makers of the 1990s followed a more contradictory course.  Although the 
goal of price stability remained a publicly declared objective, the implicit goal of policy 
(in the regulative sense) really became the performance of the equity markets. Interest 
rates in the Greenspan era were keyed to the Dow and the S & P.  Reconciling a public 
goal of stable exchange rates with an implicit objective of stock-market advance meant 
that inflationary pressures found their outlet in assets markets rather than wages or 
consumer prices.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
5.   I left a question open: whether our current era is particularly susceptible to surprise.  
My sense is that we are dealing with many surprises for a reason, in part because we are 
in a period of underlying transformation, transformations that are signaled by ruptures 
and surprises as well as trends.  The massive emergence of the Asian economies, 
especially China and India, the transformation to an economy based on information and 
its processing rather than on manufacturing, the geopolitical consequences of the end of 
cold-war bipolarity, have all contributed to the appearance of surprise.  But I cannot 
further develop this narrative at this point.  Instead let me conclude with a self-
interrogation.  At this point, you are all probably asking: why must the role of causal 
explanation be keyed to surprise?  Have I suggested anything more than the simple fact 
that all events, surprising or not, require construction of a narrative that imposes some 
sequential order on their evolution?  Conversely is not the speaker’s notion of surprise so 
broad that it encompasses all historical occurrences?  Surprise – discontinuity – occurs all 
the time: after all, every event of which we take note must be a significant departure from 
what was expected.  I am, I must confess, still in the middle of thinking these issues 
through and I’ve shared with you today a provisional reflection.  Still, it seems to me that 
whenever we construct a narrative we testify to the unexpected and finally to the 
continuing importance of surprise.  Surprise in history reveals itself as a summons to   12 
fundamentally rethink a narrative that has become insufficiently accommodating of the 
unexpected and indeed of events in general.  
 
It is the task of the historian and the social scientist alike to render surprise non-
surprising in retrospect.  The social scientist can dream of a world in which surprise is 
eliminated because all is foreseen.  But the historian must cherish its role – even when the 
surprises themselves are appalling and fearsome.  Surprise, furthermore, testifies to the 
pluralist possibilities of the social and political world.  It suggests that multiple chains or 
streams of causal development proceed at the same time, but that not all can be validated.  
Surprise in effect mediates between the counter-factual and the factual.     
   
Surprise thus justifies the historian’s role.  It suggests that sequential coherence or 
narrative remains a fundamental explanatory structure.  It compels us to reconstruct an 
alternate temporal chain of causation, a new history.  It means that historical 
reconstruction is fundamental, not just to aesthetic pleasure, but for explanation of the 
social world.  On the other hand it also suggests that every such reconstruction is 
provisional and precarious.   Still, openness to the instructiveness of surprise refreshes 
historical understanding and teaches a necessary humility to the social scientist as well.  
Not all surprises can be welcome, some are atrocious and appalling, but all are 
instructive. 